Abstract. This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others'monetary payo¤s. We introduce "more altruistic than" (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate "more generous than" (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two player extensive form games of complete information in which the …rst mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that the e¤ect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from Investment and Dictator games, the Carrot and Stick game, and the Stackelberg duopoly game and in new data from Stackelberg mini-games.
Introduction
What are the contents of preferences? People surely care about their own material well-being, e.g., as proxied by income. In some contexts people also may care about others'well-being. Abstract theory and common sense have long recognized that possibility but until recently it has been neglected in applied work. Evidence from the laboratory and …eld (as surveyed in Fehr and Gächter (2000) , for example) has begun to persuade economists to develop speci…c models of how and when a person's preferences depend on others' material payo¤s (Sobel (2005) ). Andreoni and Miller (2002) report "dictator" experiments in which a human subject decides on an allocation for himself and for some anonymous other subject while facing a linear budget constraint. Their analysis con…rms consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) for a large majority of subjects. They conclude that altruism can be modeled using neoclassical preference theory (Hicks (1939) , Samuelson (1947) ).
In this paper we take three further steps down the same path. First, we analyze non-linear opportunity sets. Such sets allow a player to reveal more about the tradeo¤ between her own and another's income, e.g., whether her indi¤erence curves have positive or negative slope, and whether they are linear or strictly convex. Second, we give another player an initial move that can be more or less generous. This allows us to distinguish conditional altruismpositive and negative reciprocity-from unconditional altruism. It also allows us to clarify the observable consequences of convex preferences and of reciprocal preferences. Third, we distinguish active from passive initial moves; i.e., we distinguish among acts of omission, acts of commission, and absence of opportunity to act, and examine their impacts on reciprocity.
Our goal is to develop an approach to reciprocity …rmly grounded in neoclassical preference and demand theory. 1 By contrast, much of the existing literature on social preferences either ignores reciprocity motives or grounds them in psychological game theory. Our focus is on how players'choices respond to observable events and opportunities, rather than to their beliefs about other players'intentions or types. Section 2 begins by developing representations of preferences over own and others'income, and formalizes the idea that one preference ordering is "more altruistic than" (MAT) another. It allows for the possibility of negative regard for the other's income; in this case MAT really means "less malevolent than." Special cases include the main parametric models of other-regarding preferences that have appeared in the literature.
Section 3 introduces opportunities and formalizes the idea that one opportunity set can be more generous than (MGT) another. It explains that MGT is a partial ordering over standard budget sets and is a complete ordering over opportunity sets in several two player games, including the well-known Investment, Dictator, and Stackelberg duopoly games. An appendix demonstrates MGT orderings of opportunity sets for several other games in the literature on social preferences. Section 4 formalizes reciprocity. Axiom R asserts that more generous choices by a …rst mover induce more altruistic preferences in a second mover. An interpretation (advocated in Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) ) is that preferences are emotional state-dependent, and the …rst mover's generosity induces a more benevolent (or less malevolent) emotional state in the second mover. Axiom S asserts that the reciprocity e¤ect is stronger following an act of commission (upsetting the status-quo) than following an act of omission (upholding the status-quo), and that the e¤ect is weaker when the …rst mover is unable to alter the status quo.
Section 5 presents three general theoretical propositions on the consequences of convex preferences. Among other things, these propositions extend standard results on revealed preference theory and show how easy it is in empirical work to con ‡ate the separate e¤ects of convexity and reciprocity.
Sections 6 -9 bring revealed altruism theory to four data sets. Proposition 4 derives testable predictions for Investment and Dictator games. Together, these two games provide diagnostic data for both Axiom R and Axiom S. Propositions 5 and 6 derive testable predictions for Carrot and Stick games and for Stackelberg duopoly games. The duopoly games are especially useful because the Follower's opportunity sets are MGT-ordered and have a parabolic shape that enables the Follower to reveal a wide range of positive and negative tradeo¤s between his own income and Leader's income. Proposition 7 obtains predictions for a new variant game, called the Stackelberg mini-game, in which the Leader has only two alternative output choices, one of which is clearly more generous than the other. This game provides diagnostic data for discriminating between the e¤ects of convexity and reciprocity.
Within the limitations of the data, the test results are consistent with predictions. Following a concluding discussion, Appendix A collects all formal proofs and other mathematical details. Instructions to subjects in the Stackelberg mini-game appear in Appendix B.
Preferences
Let Y = (Y 1 ; Y 2 ; :::; Y N ) 2 R N + represent the payo¤ vector in a game that pays each of N 2 players a non-negative income. Admissible preferences for each player i are smooth and convex orderings on the positive orthant < N + that are strictly increasing in own income Y i . The set of all admissible preferences is denoted P. Any particular preference P 2 P can be represented by a smooth utility function u : < N + ! < with positive i th partial derivative
The other …rst partial derivatives are zero for standard sel…sh preferences, but we allow for the possibility that they are positive in some regions (where the agent is "benevolent") and negative in others (where she is "malevolent").
We shall focus on two-player extensive form games of complete information, and to streamline notation we shall denote own ("my") income by Y i = m and the other player's ("your") income by Y i = y. Thus preferences are de…ned on the positive quadrant < 2 + = f(m; y) : m; y 0g: The marginal rate of substitution MRS(m; y) = u m =u y is not well de…ned at points where the agent is sel…sh; it diverges to +1 and back from 1 when we pass from slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Therefore it is convenient to work with willingness to pay, WTP= 1=MRS, the amount of own income the agent is willing to give up in order to increase the other agent's income by a unit; it moves from slightly positive through zero to slightly negative when the agent goes from slight benevolence to slight malevolence. Note that WTP= u y =u m is intrinsic, independent of the particular utility function u chosen to represent the given preferences.
What sort of factors might a¤ect w =WTP? Of course, for admissible preferences the sign of w is the same as the sign of the partial derivative u y : Convexity tells us more: w increases as one moves southward along an indifference curve. That is, my benevolence increases (or malevolence decreases) as your income decreases along an indi¤erence curve. This principle is quite intuitive, and sometimes it is useful to strengthen it as follows. We say that admissible preferences have the increasing benevolence (IB) property if w m 0. Occasionally we refer to the related property w y 0. Appendix A.1 shows how convexity, increasing benevolence, and homotheticity are related to each other and to the slope and curvature of indi¤erence curves.
We are now prepared to formalize the idea that one preference ordering on < 2 + is more altruistic than another. Two di¤erent preference orderings A; B 2 P over income allocation vectors might represent the preferences of two di¤erent players, or might represent the preferences of the same player in two di¤erent situations. The idea is straightforward. Like the single crossing property in a di¤erent context, MAT induces a partial ordering on preferences over own and others' income. In the benevolence case, A MAT B means that A has shallower indi¤erence curves than B in (m; y) space, so A indicates a willingness to pay more m for a unit increase in y than does B. In the malevolence case, WTP is less negative for A, so it indicates a lesser willingness to pay for a unit decrease in y.
Appendix A.2 veri…es that MAT is a partial ordering on P. When no particular domain D is indicated, the MAT ordering is understood to refer to the entire positive orthant D= < 2 + . Four examples illustrate how MAT is incorporated into existing parametric models.
Example 2.1. Linear Inequality-averse Preferences (for N = 2 only; Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). Let preferences J = A; B be represented by u J (m; y) = (1 + J )m J y; where
Much of the theoretical literature on social preferences relies on special assumptions that may appear to be departures from neoclassical preference theory (Hicks (1939) , Samuelson (1947) ). The preceding examples help clarify the issues. All four are examples of convex preferences, and (except for the nonlinear inequality aversion model) they are also homothetic. The inequality aversion models incorporate a very speci…c inconsistency with the neoclassical assumption of positive monotonicity: my marginal utility for your income reverses sign on the 45 degree line. A preference for e¢ ciency (i.e., for a larger income sum) is consistent with a limiting case of the quasi-maximin model, or with admissible preferences with W T P = 1. We shall now see that for more general preferences, the e¢ ciency of choices depends on the shape of the opportunity set.
Opportunities
De…ne an opportunity set F (or synonymously, a feasible set or budget set) as a convex compact subset of < 2 + : It is convenient and harmless (given preferences monotone in own income m) to assume free disposal for own income, i.e., if (m; y) 2 F then (am; y) 2 F for all a 2 [0; 1]. Thus an opportunity set F is the convex hull of two lines: (a) its projection Y F = fy 0 : 9m 0 s:t: (m; y) 2 F g on the y-axis, and (b) its Eastern boundary @ E F = f(m; y) 2 F : 8x > m; (x; y) = 2 F g. Since F is convex, each boundary point has a supporting hyperplane (i.e., tangent line) de…ned by an inward-pointing normal vector, and F is contained in its closed positive halfspace; see for example Rockafellar (1970, p. 100) . At some boundary points (informally called corners or kinks) the supporting hyperplane is not unique; examples will be noted later. At the other (regular) boundary points there is a smooth function f whose zero isoquant de…nes the boundary locally. We often need to work near vertical tangents, so rather than the usual marginal rate of transformation (MRT) we use the need to pay, NTP(m; y) = 1=MRT(m; y) = f y =f m evaluated at a regular point (m; y) 2 @ E F . Again NTP is intrinsic, independent of the choice f used to represent the boundary segment.
We seek an objective de…nition of one opportunity set G being more generous to me than another opportunity set F . There is an obvious necessary condition: that G allows me to achieve higher income than does F . Since my preferences are monotone in own income, I clearly bene…t when you allow me to increase it. For some purposes it is helpful to impose a second condition, that you don't increase your own potential income far more than mine. If you do, I might regard your move as self-serving and not especially generous.
These intuitions are captured in conditions (a) and (b) below, using the following notation. Let y F = sup Y F denote your maximum feasible income and let m F = supfm : 9y 0 s:t: (m; y) 2 F g denote my maximum feasible income in an opportunity set F .
MGT is a partial ordering over opportunity sets, as noted in Appendix A.3. Condition (a) seems compelling because it springs directly from the most basic intuitions about generosity, but one can imagine plausible variants on condition (b). To understand its role, consider an alternative de…nition of MGT, call it MGT Light, that includes only condition (a). It turns out that MGT Light has the same implications as MGT for ten of the twelve prominent examples of opportunity sets from the social preferences literature discussed in this section, section 9 and Appendix A.5. We begin with a very prominent example where condition (b) does matter. Figure 1 . The NTP is p along @ E F . Clearly m F = I and y F = I=p. To illustrate the MGT ordering, let F be determined by I F and p F and G by I G and p G : Part a of the de…nition is simply I G I F . But part b requires Figure 2 shows F s for s = 3 and 9 when I = 10 and k = 3. In the …gure, one sees that (a) m F 9 = 37 > 19 = m F 3 and (b) y F 9 y F 3 = 28 16 = 12 < 18 = 37 19 = m F 9 m F 3 , so F 9 MGT F 3 . More generally, it is straightforward to check that s > s 0 2 [0; I] implies for k 2 that F s MGT F s 0 , i.e., sending a larger amount is indeed more generous. These four examples are far from exhaustive. Section A.5 of the Appendix demonstrates natural MGT orderings of opportunity sets in many games prominent in the social preferences literature, including the Ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982), the Ultimatum mini-game (Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995) ; see also Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003) ), the Sequential public goods game with two players (Varian (1994) ), the Gift exchange labor market (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) ), the Moonlighting game (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000) ), the Power to Take game (Bosman and van Winden (2002) ), and the Ring test (Liebrand (1984) ; see also Sonnemans, van Dijk and van Winden (2005) ).
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is key to our analysis. We examine it from the perspective of neoclassical preference theory, stressing observables. Thus positive reciprocity reveals itself via preferences for altruistic actions that bene…t someone else, at one's own material cost, because that person's behavior was generous. Similarly, negative reciprocity reveals itself via preferences for actions that harm someone else, at one's own material cost, because that person's behavior was harmful to oneself. Our reciprocity axiom states that more generous choices by one player induce more altruistic preferences in a second player; by the same token, less generous choices by one induce less altruistic preferences in the other.
To formalize, consider a two person extensive form game of complete information in which the …rst mover chooses an opportunity set C 2 C, and the second mover chooses the payo¤ vector (m; y) 2 C. Initially, the second mover knows the collection C of possible opportunity sets. Prior to her choice of payo¤s, she learns the actual opportunity set C 2 C; and acquires preferences A C . Reciprocity is captured in Axiom R: Let the …rst mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover from the collection C. If F; G 2 C and
There is a traditional distinction between sins of commission (active imposition of harm) and sins of omission (failure to prevent harm). By analogy, one can draw a distinction between "virtues"of commission and omission. Another person's benevolent or malevolent intentions are more clearly revealed by an action that overturns the status quo than by inaction. Of course, sometimes there is no choice possible; the status quo cannot be altered. Intuitively, the second mover will respond more strongly to generous (or ungenerous) choices that overturn the status quo than to those that uphold it, or that involve no real choice by the …rst mover. 2 Compared to no choice, upholding the status quo should provoke the stronger response, at least when the status quo is the best or worst possible opportunity.
To formalize the intuition, suppose that the collection of opportunity sets C contains at least two elements, and one of them, C , is the status quo. Let A C and A C c respectively denote the second mover's acquired preferences when the …rst mover's chosen opportunity set C is the status quo and when it di¤ers from the status quo. On the other hand, when C is a singleton, then the …rst mover has no choice and we write C = fC o g with corresponding second mover
Axiom S: Let the …rst mover choose the actual opportunity set for the second mover from the collection C. If the status quo is either F or G and G MGT F then
Part 1 of Axiom S says that the e¤ect of Axiom R is stronger when a generous (or ungenerous) act upsets the status quo than when the same act merely upholds the status quo (or is forced). Part 2 compares the impact of upholding the status quo to forced acts. It says that the e¤ect of Axiom R is stronger for upholding the status quo, at least when that is the most (or least) generous of the options available to the …rst mover.
We will say that either axiom holds strictly when the inequalities in the MAT and the MGT part a de…nitions are both strict.
It should be emphasized that the recent preference models noted in Examples 2.1 -2.4 have no room for Axioms R and S. In those models preferences are assumed …xed, una¤ected by more or less generous opportunity sets chosen by the …rst mover. Actual choices by a …rst mover are not central even in the "reciprocity" models of Charness and Rabin (2002, Appendix), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) . Those models focus on higher-order beliefs regarding other players'intentions (or, in Levine (1998) , regarding other players'types). Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) implicitly consider Axiom R, but only within the particular parametric family of CES utility functions noted in Example 2.4.
Choice
As in neoclassical theory, our maintained assumption is that the player always chooses a most preferred point in his opportunity set F . By convexity such points must form a connected subset of F: If either preferences A or opportunities F are strictly convex then that subset is a singleton, i.e., there is a unique choice (m A ; y A ) 2 F . In this case all points in F n f(m A ; y A )g are revealed to be on lower A-indi¤erence curves than (m A ; y A ).
Not all elements of F are candidates for choice in our set up. The …rst result is that, due to strict monotonicity in own payo¤ m, only points on the Eastern boundary will be chosen, since they have larger own payo¤.
The choice is unique if either the preferences A or the opportunity set F is strictly convex.
All proofs are collected in Appendix A. The next result shows that, as admissible preferences go from maximally malevolent through neutral to maximally benevolent under the MAT ordering, the player's choices trace out the entire Eastern boundary of the opportunity set. The proposition refers to the North point N F = (m; y F ) 2 @ E F and the South point S F , the point in the Eastern boundary with smallest y-component.
Proposition 2.
Suppose that either preferences A and B, or the opportunity set F , are strictly convex. Let (m A ; y A ) and (m B ; y B ) be the points in F chosen when preferences are respectively A and B. Then
If (m; y) 2 @ E F and y B y y A , then there are preferences P with B MAT P MAT A such that (m; y) is the P-chosen point in F: (3) There are admissible preferences for which the chosen point is arbitrarily close to S F , and other admissible preferences for which the chosen point is arbitrarily close to N F .
Propositions 1 and 2 deal with a …xed opportunity set. Often we need predictions of how an agent with given preferences will choose in a new opportunity set. Neoclassical preference theory o¤ers a prediction that follows from GARP (or from convexity and positive monotonicity) in the case of standard budget sets. We will sometimes get weaker predictions and sometimes stronger predictions because we deal with more general opportunity sets and with preferences that are convex but not necessarily monotone in other's income y. The following example illustrates this.
Example 5.1. Figure 4 shows standard budget sets F with I = 1; p = 1 (solid line) and G with I = 2; p = 4 (dashed line). Suppose that a player with preferences P picks (m F ; y F ) from F . What can we predict about his choice (m G ; y G ) from G? If it happens that (m F ; y F ) is not in G then neoclassical preference theory tells us nothing about (m G ; y G ): Given the increasing benevolence property IB we can make a prediction: (m G ; y G ) lies on the sub-segment southeast of the point (m; y F ) on the G budget line, i.e., y G y F . This is a consequence of part 2a of the next Proposition.
The result in Example 5.1 can often be strengthened in nonlinear opportunity sets. The point chosen in one opportunity set can be compared to points east of it in another opportunity set using IB, as in part 2b of the next Proposition. As shown in part 3 of the next Proposition, using IB together with w y 0, we can obtain even tighter bounds on choice by constructing a point Z which solves NTP @F (X) =NTP @G (Z). (The Appendix shows how to extend the de…nition so that Z is well de…ned even with corners and kinks at which NTP is not single valued.) We say that Z = (m Z ; y Z ) is southeast of X = (m X ; y X ) if and only if y Z y X and m Z m X ; and Z is northwest of X if both inequalities are reversed. Proposition 3. Let a player with strictly convex preferences A choose X = (m F ; y F ) from opportunity set F and choose W = (m G ; y G ) from opportunity set G. Then:
, and suppose preferences A satisfy IB and w y 0.
Propositions 1-3 do not invoke Axioms R and S. We now shall see that Axiom R e¤ects can either reinforce or o¤set the standard revealed preference predictions, depending on the …rst mover's generosity. The next example also highlights unique predictions arising from Axiom S.
Example 5.2. Suppose that there is a …rst mover (FM) who picks one of the two standard budget sets for the second mover (SM) in the previous example. Since G MGT F , Axiom R implies that the SM's choice W 2 G lies northwest of the point (m G ; y G ) predicted by convexity of preferences and the IB property; since (m G ; y G ) is predicted to be southeast of (m; y F ) our model has no testable implication in this instance. Recall that neoclassical preference theory also has no testable implication when (m F ; y F ) does not belong to G. If the FM instead chooses F then Axiom R implies that the choice X lies southeast of (m F ; y F ) whereas neoclassical preference theory predicts that X = (m F ; y F ). Axiom S implies that the choice X when the status quo is F lies southeast of the choice X o when the FM has no choice, and that the choice X c when the status quo is G lies even further southeast. In contrast, neoclassical preference theory assumes preferences are …xed and therefore predicts X c = X = X o :
Diagnostic Tests of Axioms R and S with Investment and Dictator Game Data
Building on Example 5.2, one could design an experiment to test the theory using two player sequential move games involving standard budget sets that are ordered by MGT: We will, instead, use existing data from experiments with the Investment and Dictator games. (In the Dictator game, the experimenter gives the SM her opportunity set; the FM has no say in the matter.) These games are better suited to testing behavioral implications of Axioms R and S, as summarized in the following Proposition. Proposition 4 leads to a diagnostic test of Axioms R and S. Our model would be falsi…ed by observations if, contrary to parts 1 and 2, SMs return more in either game when they get s than when they get s 0 > s; or if, contrary to part 3, SMs return more in a Dictator game than in an Investment game with the same opportunity sets F s . Using a double-blind protocol, Cox (2004) gathered data from a one-shot Investment game (Treatment A) with 32 pairs of FMs and SMs. Cox also reported parallel data from a Dictator game (Treatment C) with another 32 subject pairs in which the dictators ("SMs") were given exactly the same opportunity sets by the experimenter as were given to SMs by the FMs in the Investment game. In both treatments, the choices s and r were restricted to integer values but the conclusions of Proposition 4 still hold.
To test the predictions, construct the dummy variable D = 1 for Treatment C. Regress the SM choice r on the amount sent s and its interaction with D, using a censored regression to account for the limited range of SM choices (r 2 [0; 3s]). 3 The estimated coe¢ cient for s is 0:58 ( standard error of 0:22)
with one-sided p-value of 0:006, consistent with reciprocity and parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 4. The estimated coe¢ cient for D s is 0:69 ( 0:32, p = 0:018), consistent with Axiom S and part 3 of Proposition 4. Since the coe¢ cient sum is statistically indistinguishable from 0, the convexity prediction in part 1 of Proposition 4 is neither supported nor contradicted. The above estimation uses observations for all amounts sent s. We here con…rm the Axiom S tests result by direct hypothesis tests using a subset of the data with su¢ cient observations for paired tests: s = 5 (with 7 observations in each treatment) and s = 10 (with 13 observations in each treatment). The Mann-Whitney and t-test both reject the null hypothesis of no di¤erence between the amounts returned in favor of the strict Axiom S alternative hypothesis that returns are larger in Treatment A. The one-sided p-values for the t-test (respectively the Mann-Whitney test) are 0:027(0:058) for the s = 5 data and are 0:04(0:10) for the s = 10 data. 4 
Tests with Carrot and Stick Game Data
Carrot and Stick games support within-game direct tests of our model and suggest one across-games test. The following proposition draws out the implications of these games.
Proposition 5. Let the FM in the Stick, Carrot or Carrot-Stick game choose F s as the SM's opportunity set, and let r(s) be the SM's response.
(1) If SM's preferences A are …xed and satisfy IB, then r(s) increases in s. (2) If SM's preferences satisfy Axiom R and IB, then in the Stick game r(s) increases more rapidly in s than for …xed preferences.
The model would be falsi…ed by data for any of these games in which SMs chose larger returns r(s) for smaller amounts s sent by the FM. The model suggests that for a given s; smaller (or more negative) returns r should be observed in the Stick game than in Carrot-Stick game. The reasons are twofold. First, comparing the opportunity set F The MGT ordering across games suggests that reciprocity will boost r in the Stick game above its 3 The constant is set equal to zero because this is implied by the experimental design restriction that SMs cannot return more than they receive from FMs. 4 Figure 3 in Cox (2004) showing data from Treatments A and C contains a couple of errors. A …le with (correct) data from the two treatments is available upon request to the author. value in the Carrot-Stick game. Second, comparing parts 1 and 2 of the last proposition, one sees that reciprocity boosts r in the Stick game but not in the other two. report data from Carrot, Stick and Carrot-Stick games, each with 30 pairs of FMs and SMs randomly matched over 10 periods. They focus on choices in the last 5 periods and so shall we. 5 The SM's opportunity set has a kink at r = 0 in all three games; 67%, 57%, and 41% of the SM choices are at the kink, respectively, in the Stick game, Carrot game, and Carrot-Stick game. But the kink has di¤erent implications across games because FM choices di¤er across games. Figure 6 shows the percentages of constrained (r = 0) responses in the three games for two focal FM choices of the minimum allowable amount sent (s = 40) and the equal-split amount sent (s = 120). We want to compare SM choices r across games holding the FM choice s constant, and also want to estimate the impact of s on r in each game. The kinks and resulting returns of zero lead us to separate the data into two parts corresponding to the data presentation in Figures 5 and 6 
Tests with Stackelberg Duopoly Data
A limitation of the preceding applications is that data come from games with opportunity sets with linear Eastern boundaries, so SMs face a constant NTP. The standard Stackelberg game in Example 3.4 escapes this straightjacket.
Recall that smaller output choices by the Stackelberg Leader create MGT opportunity sets for the Follower. Axiom R says that this will induce MAT preferences in the Follower. Due to the higher WTP, it seems that the Follower should choose points on the Eastern boundary with higher NTP, hence larger y, by reducing output. It's not quite that simple, however. We must also take into account preference convexity, and also the changing curvature of the opportunity set. The next proposition sorts out these e¤ects and expresses them in terms of the Follower's deviation from sel…sh best reply (the prediction of standard duopoly theory). Proposition 6 shows that an increase in q L has three di¤erent e¤ects:
-A reciprocity e¤ect, items (3) -(4) in the Proposition. If Axiom R holds strictly, then the less generous opportunity set decreases the Follower's WTP, increasing q F and q D = Q D (q L ). Axiom S moderates or intensi…es this e¤ect, depending on the status quo.
-A preference convexity (or substitution) e¤ect, item (2) in the Proposition. The choice point is pushed west, where WTP is less, again increasing q D .
-An opportunity set shape e¤ect (in some ways analagous to an income e¤ect), item (1) in the Proposition. The curvature of the parabola decreases. Holding w =WTP constant, q D increases when the Follower is malevolent (w < 0, hence q D > 0), and decreases when the Follower is benevolent (w > 0, hence q D < 0).
A parametric example may clarify the logic. For given q L 2 [0; 24], the Follower's choice set is the parabola f(m; y) :
Suppose that the Follower has …xed Cobb-Douglas preferences represented by u(m; y) = my , so WTP is m=y = q F =q L . Solving NTP=WTP, one obtains q F = Q(q L j ) = (24 q L )=(2 + ): Noting that the sel…sh best reply is q o F = Q(q L j0); one obtains a closed form expression for the deviation, q D = 4+2 (24 q L ). For …xed positive (benevolent preferences) or smaller than 2 (pathologically malevolent preferences), the deviation is negative but increasing in the Leader's output; the opposite is true when is negative but larger than 2 (moderately malevolent). This is the combined impact of the convexity (or substitution) and shape (or income) e¤ects noted above. Of course, reciprocity e¤ects will decrease and hence increase q D .
We
Table II reports the test results. All observations reveal w 1; as assumed in Proposition 6. To check for asymmetric responses to large and small FM choices (relative to the Cournot choice q L = 8), we de…ne the dummy variable DP = 1 if q L 8. All columns in the table report panel regressions with individual subject …xed e¤ects. The …rst column, with dependent variable WTP 100, …rmly rejects the hypothesis of benevolent linear and …xed preferences: the coe¢ cient for q L is signi…cantly negative, not positive. In view of part 1 of the Proposition, the second column, with dependent variable Q D , con…rms this result. We infer that Q D is an increasing function of FM output q L , consistent with convexity and reciprocity, in view of parts 2 and 3 of the Proposition. The last column reports that there is a stronger response to "greedy"FM choices in excess of the Cournot output 8 than to "generous" FM choices below or equal to output 8. One-sided p-values are shown in parentheses.
Diagnostic Tests of Reciprocity with Stackelberg Mini-Game Data
The Stackelberg duopoly game data do not permit tests of some of our most distinctive predictions. All FMs (Leaders) have the same choice set, eliminating variability that could help separate the convexity e¤ect from the reciprocity e¤ect. Also, due in part to di¤ering experiences, SMs may have di¤erent views on the generosity of a given output choice q L . In order to overcome these limitations while preserving the nice parabolic shape of the SM choice sets, we introduce a new Stackelberg variant.
Example 9.1. Stackelberg Mini-Game. Take the otherwise standard Stackelberg duopoly game in Example 3.4, but restrict the Leader (FM) to a binary output choice, q L 2 fx; zg, where 0 < x < z < 24.
The idea here is to manipulate the Leader's choice set in order to obtain a direct test of reciprocity. In one situation, a given output choice can be the smaller one allowed (hence the most generous to the Follower) and in another situation the same choice can be the larger one (hence the least generous). If a given Follower reacts di¤erently in the two situations, it must be due to reciprocity e¤ects, since by holding the Leader's output constant we have eliminated convexity and shape e¤ects. Formally, Proposition 7. In the Stackelberg Mini-Game of Example 9.1, suppose the Leader has restricted output choices q L 2 fx; sg in situation (a) and q L 2 fs; zg in another situation (b), where s is strictly between x and z. Suppose the 
Thus, contrary to standard revealed preference theory, the model predicts that the Follower's choice in a …xed opportunity set F depends in a speci…c way on the alternatives not chosen by the Leader. Our model would be falsi…ed by observations if Followers choose larger quantities or reveal higher WTPs when Leaders forgo z > s to choose s than when Leaders forgo x < z to choose s:
In our new Stackelberg mini-game experiment, each subject in the FM role twice chooses q L 2 f6; 9g and twice chooses q L 2 f9; 12g without feedback. Each subject in the SM role is then paired simultaneously with four di¤erent FMs and chooses an integer value of q F 2 f5; 6; :::; 11g with no feedback. The corresponding payo¤s (m; y) are clearly displayed. Subjects are paid for one of the four choices, selected randomly at the end of the session. The "double blind" procedures are detailed in the instructions to subjects, reproduced in Appendix B.
To infer how individual subjects respond to reciprocity concerns, we turn again to panel regressions with individual subject …xed e¤ects. The second column in Table III reports that, consistent with Proposition 7, SMs'average WTP decreased by almost 8 cents per dollar when q L = 9 was the less generous choice (indicated by D9 = 1). The second column reports the same data in a di¤erent way: the output deviation increased by 0:34 on average, signi…cant at the p = 0:016 level (one-sided) when D9 = 1. Since the opportunity set F 9 is constant in these 72 data points, the result cannot be due to convexity or shape e¤ects; it must be pure reciprocity. The last column of Table III reports regressions for q D for the entire data set, using the additional dummy variable D12, which takes value 1 if q L = 12; and 0 otherwise: 6 The signs of all coe¢ cient estimates are consistent with Axioms R and S and convexity. (24) 72 (24) 91 (24) a One-sided p-values are shown in brackets.
b Nobs is the total number of observations (gr is the number of groups).
Discussion
Neoclassical theory (e.g., Hicks (1939) , Samuelson (1947) ) clari…ed and uni…ed earlier work on how opportunities and preferences jointly determine outcomes for homo economicus. The present paper applies those now-classic ideas to social preferences. We focus on need to pay (NTP), the reciprocal of the marginal rate of transformation of own income into others'income, and willingness to pay (WTP), the reciprocal of the marginal rate of substitution between own income and others'income. Increasing WTP along indi¤erence curves is simply convexity, and convex altruistic preferences provide a uni…ed account of several social motives previously considered separately, such as e¢ ciency, maximin, and inequality aversion. We develop a theory of reciprocal altruism: how choices by one player shift preferences of another player and determine outcomes for homo reciprocans. We say that one opportunity set G is more generous to person X than another opportunity set F; and write G MGT F; if the maximum income in G for person X exceeds his maximum in F , and does so by more that the corresponding income di¤erence for the other player. We say that one set of preferences is more altruistic than (MAT) another if it has a larger WTP at every point. We formalize reciprocity as a MAT-tilt in preferences following a MGT choice by others. The de…nitions apply to malevolent (WTP < 0) as well as benevolent (WTP > 0) preferences, and automatically combine positive and negative reciprocity.
Convexity and reciprocity are quite di¤erent formally and conceptually, but we show that empirical work has a natural tendency to confound the two notions. The problem is simply that more generous behavior by a …rst mover tends to push the second mover's opportunities southeast, towards larger income for the second mover and smaller income for the …rst mover. Convexity typically implies greater WTP as one pushes southeast, even when there is no MAT-shift in preferences due to reciprocity.
Axiom R and Axiom S set revealed altruism theory apart from neoclassical preference theory. In neoclassical theory, my preferences are an individual characteristic that is independent of your prior actions that help or harm me. In contrast, Axiom R asserts that more generous choices by you induce more altruistic preferences in me. Axiom S further asserts that my induced preferences are more altruistic when your generous choice is an act of commission (upsetting the status-quo) than when it is an act of omission (upholding the status-quo), and that this reciprocity e¤ect is even weaker when you are unable to alter the status quo. The theory incorporates negatively-reciprocal altruism: less generous choices by you induce less altruistic preferences in me, where "less altruistic"can mean "more malevolent."
Several theoretical propositions develop the observable consequences of neoclassical properties such as convexity and the new reciprocity Axioms. We show that more northerly choices on the Eastern boundary of an opportunity set reveal more altruistic (or less malevolent) preferences. For …xed preferences, choices in one opportunity set reveal bounds on preferences that translate into bounds on choices in other opportunity sets. For reciprocal preferences, a …rst mover's choice of a more or less generous opportunity set translates into bounds on a second mover's choice, and the bounds are contingent on the status quo ante. We derive propositions tailored to a set of well-known two player games: Investment, Dictator, Carrot and/or Stick, and Stackelberg duopoly. The tailored propositions sort out the separate e¤ects of the neoclassical properties and the new Axioms. The paired Investment and Dictator games provide a diagnostic test of the implications of both Axiom R and Axiom S. The new Stackelberg mini-game provides a diagnostic separation of the implications of convexity and reciprocity.
Finally, to illustrate the empirical content of the theory, we examine three existing data sets and one new data set. Existing data from Investment and Dictator experiments reject null hypotheses inconsistent with Axioms R and S in favor of alternative hypotheses consistent with the Axioms (and convexity). Existing data from the Stick game and the Carrot and Stick game support implications of Axiom R (and convexity). Existing data from a Stackelberg duopoly experiment con…rm reciprocity/convexity e¤ects and suggest a stronger negative response to greedy behavior than the positive response to generous behavior. Data from a new experiment with the Stackelberg minigame con…rm that reciprocity has a signi…cant impact even when convexity e¤ects are held constant. The Stackelberg mini-game brings out a novel feature of the new theory: contrary to standard revealed preference theory, revealed altruism theory explains how alternatives not chosen by another can a¤ect one's own choice.
Theoretical clari…cation sets the stage for further empirical work. One can now re…ne earlier empirical studies that examine the combined e¤ects of altruism and reciprocity. Such work should shed light not only on the extent to which typical human preferences depart from sel…shness but also on the extent to which such departures are altered by experiencing generous or ungenerous behavior.
Further theoretical work is also in order. We consider two versions of the "more generous than" relation but yet other versions may have implications that are stronger (or just di¤erent). For example, generosity might be de…ned in terms of players'utilities rather than in terms of material payo¤s (although this would compromise observability). Other open theoretical questions concern Axiom S, which invokes the status quo to distinguish between acts of commission and omission, and between generous and greedy acts. But what does it take for a particular act to become generally recognized as the status quo? What if an act has bene…cial short run impact but is harmful in the long run? Answers to these and other questions await further theoretical development. cg is convex for all c 2 < (convex). Recall also that willingness to pay is w = w(m; y) =WTP(m; y) = u y =u m :
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It will be helpful to express convexity in terms of the curvature of indi¤erence curves. At a given point, curvature has absolute value jKj = 1=R, where R is the radius of the circle that is second-order tangent to the curve at the given point. Let denote the angle of the tangent to the indi¤erence curve with the negative y-direction. The signed curvature is K = d =ds where 
Since the expression inside the radical is positive, the sign of K is that of Q.E.D.
0 at every regular boundary point of an opportunity set.
Proof:
The reasoning is the same as in the previous Lemma. Along the boundary
Thus K = d =ds has the same sign as d(N T P )=dy: Our feasible opportunity set F lies on the left or on the tangent hyperplane at a point from the boundary @F: Hence, as y increases the boundary is turning left, so increases and (by A.3) NTP increases.
Q.E.D.
The next Lemma characterizes homotheticity in order to facilitate comparisons to the weaker properties used in the Propositions. Proof: By de…nition, preferences are homothetic if and only if they can be represented by a utility function u(m; y) whose ratio of partial derivatives u m =u y depends only on the ratio m=y (e.g., Simon and Blume (1994, p. 503)). Thus condition (a) implies that w = u y =u m is constant along the ray with r = m=y and so condition (b) must hold. In turn, condition (b) implies that along that ray 0 = dw=dt = w m dm=dt + w y dy=dt = w m + w y r, establishing condition (c). Since rays with r > 0 foliate < 2 + n (0; 0); condition (c) implies that w and hence u m =u y depend only on r = m=y; i.e., (a) must hold.
Q.E.D. + is equivalent to IB for preferences that are not very malevolent, and is equivalent to w m 0 for preferences that are rather malevolent.
Proof: For part a we need to show that w m (m; y) is non-negative. It su¢ cies to show that the sign of w(m + ; y) w(m; y) is the same as the sign of , for all . If > 0 then (m + ; y) is on a ray (R y=(m+ ) ) with a smaller slope than the ray through (m; y): This, convexity and homotheticity imply that w(m+ ; y) w(m; y). Similarly, w(m+ ; y) w(m; y) for negative : For part b, recall from Lemma A.1 that convexity is equivalent to w m w w y 0: But this is equivalent to w m 0 (w m 0) if w w y =w m (w w y =w m ):
To see the bite of the assumptions, consider preferences represented by u(m; y) = m r =r y (1+r) =(1 + r). For r > 1 these preferences are IB but neither convex nor homothetic. For r 2 (0; 1), however, they are convex but neither IB nor homothetic.
A.2. Proof that MAT is a Partial Ordering. The properties of re ‡exivity and transitivity are inherited from the re ‡exivity and transitivity of the real ordering . The antisymmetry property follows from Hicks' Lemma (Hicks (1939, Appendix)): if preferences have the same MRS (or WTP) everywhere in a domain D then they are the same on that domain.
A.3. Proof that MGT is a Partial Ordering. Re ‡exivity, antisymmetry and transitivity all are inherited from the corresponding properties of the real ordering .
A.4. Proof that Stackelberg Follower' s opportunity sets are MGTranked. The Follower's opportunity set F q L has Eastern boundary f(m; y) :
Along this boundary NTP is given by
Note that NTP varies smoothly from positive to negative values as increasing
2 is obtained from the standard (sel…sh) reaction function
Q.E.D.
A.5. Examples of MGT-ordered Opportunity Sets. Example A.6. Ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982)). The responder's opportunities in the $10 ultimatum game consist of the origin (0; 0) and (due to our free disposal assumption) the horizontal line segment from (0; 10 x) to (x; 10 x). This set is not convex so it doesn't qualify as an opportunity set by our de…nition. Its convex hull, however, is the opportunity set in the Convex Ultimatum game (Andreoni, Castillo and Petrie (2003) , which is identical to that of the Power to Take game in the following example. The NTP along the boundary of the opportunity set is 1 above and 1=k below the t = 0 locus, is 0 along the y axis, and is 1 along the m-axis. Again, curvature at all regular boundary points is K = 0. It is straightforward to verify that larger s produces higher MGT-ranking.
Example A.10. Gift exchange labor markets (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) ). The employer with initial endowment I o¤ers a wage W 2 [0; I] and the worker then chooses an e¤ort level e 2 [0; 1] with a quadratic cost function c(e). The …nal payo¤s are m = W c(e) for the worker and y = I + ke W for the employer, where the productivity parameter k = 10 in a typical game. The worker's opportunity set is similar to the second mover's in the investment game, except that the Northeastern boundary is a parabolic arc instead of a straight line of slope 1. Along this Eastern boundary NTP is 2e and the curvature is 1=5(4e 2 + 1) 3=2 : Also, if the employer o¤ers a wage in excess of his endowment I then the opportunity set includes part of the quadrant [m > 0 > y]. It is straightforward but a bit messy to extend the de…nition of opportunity set to include such possibilities. Again, one can directly verify that larger W produces higher MGT-ranking.
Example A.11. Sequential VCM public good game with two players (Varian (1994) ). Each player has initial endowment I. Since w P is continous on < 2 + , classic theorems assure the existence of a utility function whose WTP is w P (Y ) (Hurewicz (1958, p. 7-10) ; see also Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) ). Let P the preferences represented by this utility function. Since the hypothesis implies that 0 < k < 1, we have B MAT P MAT A. By construction, (m; y) is P-chosen since w P (m; y) =NTP(m; y):
Part 3. Linear preferences with w approaching 1 (+1) yield choices arbitrarily close to S F (N F ): W T P (X), while N T P @F (X) N T P @G (Y ), optimality of X (so W T P (X) = N T P @F (X)) and transitivity together imply that W T P (Y ) N T P @G (Y ): By convexity of A all points from @G north of Y are on lower A indi¤erence curves than Y so they cannot be W: Thus W must be south of Y , and 2a follows. One obtains 2b in just the same way.
Part 3. Suppose Z is southeast of X: Then
where the …rst inequality follows by assumption whereas the equalities follow from optimality of X and by construction of Z. By convexity of A all points from @G south of Z are on lower A indi¤erence curves than Z so they cannot be W: That is, W must be north of Z. Likewise for the case with Z northwest of X.
Q.E.D. 
A.11. Proof of Proposition 6 (Stackelberg Duopoly Game). The F OC can be written as
Inserting the de…nition of Q D from the statement of the proposition, we obtain
Part 1. Linear preferences. If Follower's preferences are …xed and linear with WTP= w then di¤erentiation of (A.5) with respect to q L gives
Part 2. Convex Preferences. If Follower's preferences are …xed and convex then
dq L The additional (second) term above is positive because, as we now will verify, The current assumptions of w 1, convexity and IB (i.e. w m 0) ensure that the right-hand-side of the last expression is non-negative whereas left-hand side is negative, so the inequality holds.
Part 3. Axiom R E¤ect. Let w r (q F ; q L ) denote WTP for changed preferences as per Axiom R. Then
From Axiom R the second term is positive and similarly as in part 2 for the sign of the third term. Part 4. Axiom S E¤ect. Let w s (q F ; q L ) denote WTP for changed preferences as in Axiom S. Then
has an additional positive (negative) term if the status quo is smaller (larger) than q L :
A.12. Q.E.D.
Appendix B. Instructions
Welcome This is an experiment about decision-making. You will be paid a $5 participation fee plus an additional positive or zero amount of money determined by the decisions that you and the other participants make, as explained below. Payment is in cash at the end of the experiment. A research foundation has provided the funds for this experiment. No Talking Allowed Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk. If you have a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.
A Monitor and Two Groups
A monitor will be selected randomly from among those of you who came here today. The rest of you have been divided randomly into two groups, called the First Mover Group and the Second Mover Group.
Complete Privacy
The experiment is structured so that no one -not even the experimenters, the monitor, and the other subjects -will ever know your personal decision in the experiment. You collect your cash payment from a sta¤ person in the Economics Department o¢ ce who has no other role in the experiment. Your payment is in a sealed envelope with a code letter (A, B, C, etc). Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student ID number will appear on any decision records. The only identifying mark on the decision forms will be a code letter known only to you. You will show your code letter to the sta¤ person and nobody else will see it. The experimenters will not be in the department o¢ ce when you collect you cash payment. This procedure is used to protect your privacy. The Idea of the Game The game involves two players, called the First Mover (FM) and the Second Mover (SM), in the roles of producers of an identical good. Each decides how much to produce. The pro…t for each player is the number of units he decides to produce times price, net of cost. The price of the good decreases as total production increases. If you and the other player produce too much, you will drive down the price and your pro…ts. Of course, if you don't produce much you won't have many units to sell. To simplify your task, the pro…ts will be calculated for you and shown in an easy-to-read table. Your cash payment will include the pro…t you earn in one round of the game. The round will be selected randomly at the end of the experiment. Game Details Each round the FM chooses between two possible amounts to produce, as shown in a table with two rows. The SM sees the choice of the FM, and then decides among seven possible amounts to produce, as shown in seven columns of the same table. The table shows the pro…ts for both players. The FM's pro…t is shown in italics in the lower left corner of each box, and the SM's pro…t is shown in bold in the upper right corner. For example, in Table B .I below, if FM chooses Output=6 and SM then chooses Output=4, then FM's pro…t is 84 and SM's pro…t is 56. 
Di¤erent Subject Pairs in Every Decision
Each First Mover and each Second Mover will make four decisions. But the pairing of First Movers with Second Movers will be di¤erent in every decision. This means that you will interact with a DIFFERENT person in the other group in every decision that you make.
Experiment Procedures and the Monitor
At the beginning of the experiment, the monitor will walk through the room carrying a box containing unmarked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in the First Mover Group will take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope will contain the experiment decision forms and a code letter. After the First Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front of the room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important that the First Movers do NOT return their code letters to the large manila envelopes, because they will need them to collect their payo¤s. After all First Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor will take the box to another room in which the experimenters will sort the decision forms and place them in the correct large manila envelopes for the Second Movers. The experimenters will also put code letters in the envelopes for the Second Movers. Next, the Monitor will walk through the room carrying a box containing unmarked, large manila envelopes. Each subject in the Second Mover Group will take one of these envelopes from the box. This envelope will contain the experiment decision forms and a code letter. After the Second Movers have made their decisions, they return the experiment decision forms to their large manila envelopes and then walk to the front of the room and deposit the envelopes in the box on the table. It is very important that the Second Movers do NOT return their code letters in the large manila envelopes because they will need them to collect their payo¤s. After all Second Movers have deposited their envelopes in the box, the Monitor will take the box to another room in which the experimenters will record the pro…ts and cash payments determined by the subjects'decisions.
A Roll of a Die Determines Which Decision Pays Money
Although you will make four decisions, only one will pay cash. Which of these decisions will pay cash will be determined by rolling a six-sided die. The experimenter will roll the die in front of you and the monitor will announce which of the numbered sides has ended up on top. The …rst number from 1 to 4 that ends up on top will determine the page number of the decision that pays cash. The monitor's cash payment will be the average of all First Movers and Second Movers payments. Be Careful Be careful in recording your decisions. If a First Mover forgets to circle one of the rows in the table, or circles both rows on the same decision page, then it will be impossible to ascertain what decision the First Mover made. In that case, the First Mover will get paid 0 and the Second Mover will get paid 60 if that decision page is selected for payo¤ by the roll of the die. If a Second Mover doesn't circle a column, then it will be impossible to ascertain what decision the Second Mover made. In that case, the Second Mover will get paid 0 and the First Mover will get paid 60 if that decision page is selected for payo¤ by the roll of the die.
Pay Rates
For each point of pro…t you earn, the experimenter will put a …xed number of dollars in your envelope. This …xed number is called the pay rate and is written on the board at the front of the room. Today's pay rate is $0.25, which means that every participant earns 25 cents for each pro…t point shown in the 
